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Scary Patents
By Stephen McJohn*
¶1

There are plenty of scary patents out there.1 Especially with subject matter like
software and business methods, patents of uncertain scope and validity cast a shadow
over innovation in new technologies.2 Blackboard holds a patent with some inscrutable
claims that might cover the basic use of a web page to serve a class.3 Google has been
sued for infringing a “stinky” patent issued on a “[d]istributed computer database system
and method.”4 One issued patent could be interpreted to cover the wiki system used by
such sites as Wikipedia.5 A number of issued patents contain broad claims for methods
that appear to do little more than take existing methods and put them in software, such as
a “[m]ethod for minimizing reintroduction of participants at successive social events,” an
“[a]pparatus and method for perusing selected vehicles having a clean title history,” or
“[a] method for automated analysis of an essay.”6 The holder of a patent on an
“[e]lectronic book security and copyright protection system” has filed an infringement
action against Amazon.com, seller of the Kindle eBook reader.7 Many issued software

* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. I appreciate terrific research work by Jonas
Jacobsen and Joseph Koipally.
1
See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS,
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 199, 256 (2008) (discussing many flaws with software and
business method patents, which often have abstract patent claims that are unclear about what technology
they cover, may be read to cover technologies that are unknown at the time the patent is filed, and use
broad wording whose meaning might change over time, especially in the fast-moving fields of technology).
2
Cf. Vincent Chiappetta, Defining the Proper Scope of Internet Patents: If We Don’t Know Where We
Want to Go, We’re Unlikely to Get There, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 289, 334 (2001) (arguing
that patent applicants in new subject matter areas should be required to search and disclose preexisting
publicly disclosed technology).
3
U. S. Patent No. 6,988,138 (filed June 30, 2000).
4
See Northeastern U. Sues Google Over Stinky Patent, PATNEWS INTERNET PAT. NEWS SERVICE
(Gregory Aharorian, Belmont, Mass.), Nov. 12, 2007. PATNEWS provides information and incisive
commentary on the problems with the patent system and intellectual property issues generally. It noted
several likely weak spots in the litigation against Google: the patent’s validity is suspect, because it very
likely was obvious in light of earlier technology; key terms in the claims were undefined and appear
indefinite in light of the written description; even if the claims were valid, Google did not engage in all the
steps necessary to infringe (rather, other parties such as other web sites performed some of the steps, and
infringement does not occur when no single party performs all the infringing steps—a plaintiff cannot sum
up the acts of different defendants). On problems with software patents generally, see http://www.iplawquality.com/ (website of editor and publisher of the Internet Patent News Service). Google (along with
Apple and Napster) are subject of suit for allegedly infringing a patented “system for managing and
marketing digital media content.” See Michael Madison, Owning the Internet (Again), MADISIONIAN.NET,
Jan. 3, 2007, http://madisonian.net/2007/01/03/owning-the-internet-again/.
5
See U.S. Patent No. 6,052,717 (filed Oct. 23, 1996) (describing an interactive web book system).
6
LawGeek, http://lawgeek.typepad.com/ (last visited June 21, 2009) (providing examples of patents
dubious on other grounds, such as inventions that are unlikely to work, and therefore are unpatentable for
lack of utility and enablement); see, e.g., LawGeek,
http://lawgeek.typepad.com/lawgeek/2005/11/pto_issues_pate.html (last visited June 21, 2009)
(discussing patent issued for “Space Vehicle Propelled by the Pressure of Inflationary Vacuum State”).
7
See, e.g., Greg Sandoval, Discovery hits Amazon with Kindle Patent Suit, CNET NEWS, Mar. 17, 2009,
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patents are said to be little more than trivial variants of existing technology.8 Such
patents may be like landmines, because patent infringement may be innocent. One can
infringe even without knowledge of the patent (let alone copying from the patented
technology).9 Such patents have caused widespread criticism of software patent scope
and validity.10 Every enterprise faces the risk that it will independently develop a product
or business, and yet face an infringement action based on a patent that it was completely
unaware of.11
Software and business method patents, perhaps more than patents for things like
bridges or drugs, raise two particular problems.12 They are often abstract and the
previous work in the field is often difficult to locate.13 A patent on a business method,
such as managing inventory, marketing a product, hedging risks using derivatives, or
servicing customer relationships, may apply in many different industries.14 A software
invention may likewise find application in many areas.15 That would be true of such
inventions as a method of sorting data, a method of controlling machinery, and an
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10198185-93.html?tag=mncol.
8
See, e.g., Richard Stallman, The Anatomy of a Trivial Patent, LINUX TODAY, May 26, 2000,
http://www.linuxtoday.com/news_story.php3?ltsn=2000-05-26-004-04-OP-LF.
9
A number of commentators have called for an independent creation defense in patent law. See, e.g.,
Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention Defense in Intellectual Property, 69
ECONOMICA 535 (2002) (arguing that independent creation defense would preserve incentives to invent,
but also permit more efficient use of inventions), available at http://www.dklevine.com/archive/scotchmerindependent-invention.pdf; Stephen M. McJohn, A New Tool for Analyzing Intellectual Property, 5 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 101, 112 (2006) (arguing that an independent creation defense could “preserve the
incentive for innovation while reducing the costs of invalid patents and uncertain claim interpretation”);
Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475
(2006) (arguing that independent creation defense would more optimally adjust economic effects of patent
rights).
10
Cf. Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 613-14 (1999); Jay P. Kesan
& Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents Survive in the Market and How Should We Change? –The Private
and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 95, 123 (2006); Pamela Samuelson, Why Reform the U.S.
Patent System? Considering Three Important Reforms to Improve the Current System, 47 COMM. ACM 19,
21-22 (2004).
11
Other patents are scary in a more amusing sense. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,754,472 (filed Apr. 27,
2000) (describing a method and apparatus for Distributing Power and Data to Devices Coupled to the
Human Body). See also Top Five Scary Patents, http://will.state.wy.us/gowyld/scary.html (last visited June
21, 2009); U.S. Patent No. 748,284 (issued Dec. 29, 1903) (describing a Method of Preserving the Dead);
U.S. Patent No. 1,123,683 (filed Sep. 20, 1913) (describing a Process for Extracting Metals from Living
Bodies); U.S. Patent No. 1,256,594 (issued Feb. 19, 1918) (describing a Safety Suit for Aviators); U.S.
Patent No. 1,204,437 (filed Apr. 7, 1915) (describing a Means for Correcting the Human Hand for Musical
Purposes); U.S. Patent No. 3,216,423 (issued Nov. 9, 1965) (describing an Apparatus for Facilitating the
Birth of a Child by Centrifugal Force).
12
See generally BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1; BEN KLEMENS, MATH YOU CAN’T USE: PATENTS,
COPYRIGHT, AND SOFTWARE 131 (2006). But see John R. Allison & Ronald J. Mann, Disputed Quality of
Software Patents, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 297 (2007) (empirical study suggesting that quality of software
patents is not worse than other fields, with respect to disclosure of prior art). See generally ADAM B. JAFFE
& JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004) (discussing many flaws in
the existing patent system). Some have suggested that patent protection is inapt due to the nature of
software. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2312 (1994) (proposing sui generis protection for software).
13
See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 199.
14
See KLEMENS, supra note 12.
15
Id.
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implementation of a business method—such as software for managing inventory or
administering a mutual fund. Terminology may often be abstract and meanings can
change over time. Even a straightforward term like “frame” has changed meaning and
therefore, the potential scope of patents involving framing technology.16 Abstraction may
result in granting patent protection for an invention far beyond the scope of the inventor’s
work.17 In addition, it makes it much more difficult for potential infringers or licensees to
know whether their activity falls within the claims of a patent.18 Someone developing a
drug may be able to search the relevant patents to see if the target molecule is already
patented. But someone creating a business method or developing new software could not
search for every patent they might be infringing because that would be tantamount to
searching every business method and software patent (as opposed to our pharmaceutical
inventor, who can restrict her search to a particular area of chemical patents). Software is
a “widely-applied, general-purpose technology,” so patents from one industry may be
readily infringed by others in a completely different industry.19 Most software patents are
held not by software companies, but by firms in other industries that develop software as
part of their business.20 Indeed, even a typical software company, quite rationally, does
not attempt to determine whether it is infringing the patents of others, even though it
could attempt to search at least within the area of software inventions that are closest to
its field.21
The second principal problem with software and business method patents is the
“prior art” problem.22 In theory, a patent should only issue if a claimed invention is new23
and nonobvious in light of what others have already done.24 But to make that
determination correctly requires identifying relevant patents, publications, and
products—the “prior art.” With a drug, it might be relatively easy to identify the relevant
prior art, such as patents in that field, relevant specialized scientific journals, and sources
of industry information. But information about software and business methods is not so
neatly categorized. A patent examiner or infringing defendant may not locate a piece of
invalidating prior art if the publication is in a far different field from that of the invention.
In addition, much software and many business methods are simply never described in
publications. Software developers do not necessarily publish their code, and business
methods are often not described in printed publications.
The Blackboard patent on “Internet-based education support system and methods”
illustrates both issues. The patent claims are broad and abstract, but can be read to cover
any system that provides instructors, students and administrators different levels of access

16

See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 195-96.
See id. at 256.
18
See id. at 200 (explaining why the breadth of claims is unclear in many software patents).
19
See id. at 190.
20
Id.
21
Cf. Mark A. Lemley, What ifs and Other Alternative Intellectual Property and Cyberlaw Story:
Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19 (2008).
22
Others have suggested that the prior art problem may not be worse with patents than in other areas.
See Martin Campbell-Kelly & Patrick Valduriez, A Technical Critique of Fifty Software Patents, 9 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 249 (2005).
23
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
24
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
17
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to online course material.25 Locating all relevant prior art in order to determine whether
the invention is new and nonobvious is difficult because the patent can cut across several
fields, including education, software development, and communications.
Not
surprisingly, the patent is surrounded by uncertainty. In February 2008, a jury awarded
Blackboard millions of dollars in damages against an alleged infringer.26 Meanwhile, the
patent office was reexamining the patent, and in March 2008 reversed itself and
preliminarily rejected the patent claims.27 The Federal Circuit subsequently held some of
the patent claims invalid.28 Pending further litigation, the validity and scope of the patent,
and related patents held by Blackboard, remain undecided.29
The uncertainty created by such patents may be reduced by the Federal Circuit’s
recent restrictions on the scope of patentable subject matter. In re Bilski30 announced a
new test for patentable subject matter, reversing a decades-long trend that had broadened
patent subject matter to include business methods31 (even tax strategies32 or methods to
enforce patents33) and software.34 The Bilski court announced a new test that could
exclude many processes from patent protection: “A claimed process is surely patenteligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it
transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.”35

25

The first claim covers: “A course-based system for providing to an educational community of users
access to a plurality of online courses, comprising: a) a plurality of user computers, with each user
computer being associated with a user of the system and with each user being capable of having predefined
characteristics indicative of multiple predetermined roles in the system, each role providing a level of
access to a plurality of data files associated with a particular course and a level of control over the data files
associated with the course with the multiple predetermined user roles comprising at least two user’s
predetermined roles selected from the group consisting of a student role in one or more course associated
with a student user, an instructor role in one or more courses associated with an instructor user and an
administrator role associated with an administrator user, and b) a server computer in communication with
each of the user computers over a network, the server computer comprising: means for storing a plurality of
data files associated with a course, means for assigning a level of access to and control of each data file
based on a user of the system’s predetermined role in a course; means for determining whether access to a
data file associated with the course is authorized; means for allowing access to and control of the data file
associated with the course if authorization is granted based on the access level of the user of the system.”
U.S. Patent No. 6,988,138 (filed June 30, 2000).
26
See Doug Lederman, Blackboard Loses on Appeal, INSIDE HIGHER ED, July 28, 2009,
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/07/28/blackboard.
27

See Michael Feldstein, All 44 Blackboard Patent Claims Invalidated by USPTO, E-LITERATE, Mar.
28, 2008, http://mfeldstein.com/all-44-blackboard-patent-claims-invalidated-by-uspto/.
28
See Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn Inc., No. 2008-1548, slip op. at 26 (Fed. Cir. July 27, 2009).
29

30

See Lederman, supra note 26.

545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). , cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S.Ct. 2735 (U.S. June 1,
2009) (No. 08-964)
31
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
32
Cf. Andrew A. Schwartz, The Patent Office Meets the Poison Pill: Why Legal Methods Cannot be
Patented, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 333, 335 (2007).
33
The Halliburton Corporation was evidently so bothered by the assertion of patents that it filed its own
application for a patent on a method of “patent acquisition and assertion by a (non-inventor) first party
against a second party.” See Cory Doctorow, Halliburton Tries to Patent Patent Trolling Itself, BOING
BOING, Nov. 11, 2008, http://www.boingboing.net/2008/11/17/halliburton-tries-to.html.
34
State Street, 149 F.3d at 1368.
35
Id. at 954.
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This article analyzes the likely role that this machine-or-transformation test will
play in the future of patent law. The Supreme Court has granted a petition for writ of
certiorari to review the Bilski decision.36 The Supreme Court, in recent years, has
rejected rigid tests in patent law created by the Federal Circuit.37 But if Bilski is read
flexibly, its approach could prove useful in several areas of patent law. The Supreme
Court could well affirm the result in Bilski and approve the emphasis on avoiding
preemption of laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas, while instructing
the courts not to rigidly apply the machine-transformation test formulated in Bilski.
Part I discusses the development of the law leading up to the machine-ortransformation test, along with the parallel increase of the patentability of software and
business methods. Part II analyzes Bilski, both its reading of Supreme Court precedent
and the new test it announces. In addition, as a thought experiment, this article looks at
great inventions of history to see how Bilski would apply. Part III suggests that, despite
Bilski’s jurisprudential shortcoming, the test it announces will have a strong positive
influence on the development of patent law. Although the Bilski test relies on vague
terms and illusory distinctions, the same is true of the central test for the scope of
copyright protection.
Ideas are not protected by copyright law.38 Although the dichotomy in copyright
law between ideas (which are not protected) and expressions (which are protected) is
illusory, the analytical framework it provides has served well to adapt copyright to a
broad range of subject matter and to new technologies, like software. The very
vagueness of the test has permitted courts to develop case law that both provides
guidance for parties about the scope of copyright protection and balances a number of
competing policies. Indeed, the test has proved flexible enough to adapt to different
subject matters areas from fiction, like Groundhog Day,39 to fact-based works, like Who
Destroyed the Hindenburg,40 to functional works, like the menu command structure of a
spreadsheet program.
Part III then turns to more modest patent law rules, suggesting that enablement,
claim interpretation, and the definiteness requirement may, in practice, play a more
important role than the limits on patentable subject matter. Bilski will have influence
here, because courts can use those doctrines to work against the same hazard Bilski seeks
to prevent—the risk that a patent could preempt a broader area of technology. This
policy against preemption can supply a unifying principle to the recent case law on
enablement, in which courts have held that a valid claim must be supported by
disclosure.41 The policy against preemption can likewise support a trend in the cases

36

In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S.Ct.
2735 (U.S. June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964).
37

See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (rejecting Federal Circuit’s rigid teachingsuggestion-motivation test for obviousness); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)
(rejecting Federal Circuit’s rigid presumption for granting of injunctive relief).
38
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
39
Arden v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
40
See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980).
41
See Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 498 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Reiffin, 199 F. App’x
965 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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toward more fully enforcing the requirement that patent claims be definite.42 That rule,
although rooted in claim drafting, can serve to prevent indefinite claims that can
subsequently be read to apply to after-developed technology.
¶10
The remainder of Part III turns to claim interpretation. Bilski takes a top-down
approach to patents by announcing limits on patent’s territory. Claim interpretation takes
a bottom-up approach, because the scope of every patent depends on how its particular
claims are interpreted. Courts can use claim interpretation to limit the scope of the patent
to the contribution of the inventor. To make claim interpretation more predictable, courts
could also make greater use of two doctrines that have played little role in software and
business method cases: the interpretation of transition phrases and the reverse doctrine of
equivalents.
I. THE ROAD TO BILSKI: ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE THE PATENTABILITY OF SOFTWARE AND
BUSINESS METHODS
¶11

Leading up to Bilski, a series of Supreme Court and Federal Circuit cases
struggled to provide clear guidance on the proper scope of patentable subject matter. The
general principles of patentable subject matter are easy to state: products of nature,
abstract ideas, and pure mathematics are not patentable, but the application of a natural
phenomenon, an abstract idea, or a mathematical principle is patentable.43 Furthermore,
“[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract
intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work.”44 But courts have not been able to define the distinction between
ideas and their application.45 This distinction proved the most troublesome with respect
to abstract subject matter like software or business methods.46 A computer program or a
business process is somewhat abstract by nature, since it can usually be applied to more
than one area of endeavor. The courts have tried to prevent overly broad patents, while
leaving room for patents on specific applications. Early cases on patentable subject
matter had broad language that seemed to make software generally unpatentable, while
later cases opened the door for software and business patents generally (setting the stage
for Bilski’s attempt to reconcile the two sets of cases).
¶12
In Gottschalk v. Benson,47 the Supreme Court held unpatentable a method of
programming a digital computer to convert signals from binary-coded decimal form
(“BCD”) into pure binary form. Although computers process numbers in binary format,
numbers are frequently converted to BCD to make them easier to read. For instance, the
number 53 is represented as 110101 in binary form.48 In BCD, however, the number 53
is encoded as 0101 0011 (5 is encoded as 0101 and 3 as 0011, so 53 becomes 0101 0011
42

43

See, e.g., Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
Id. at 67.
45
See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Kuhn, Patentable Subject Matter Matters: New Uses for an Old Doctrine, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 89 (2007).
46
Cf. Dana Remus Irwin, Paradise Lost in the Patent Law? Changing Visions of Technology in the
Subject Matter Inquiry, 60 FLA. L. REV. 775 (2008).
47
409 U.S. 63 (1972).
48
Id. at 66-67.
44
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in BCD).49 It is then often necessary to convert from BCD form to binary form, for
example, to convert 0101 0011 to 110101. The patented invention was a method of
programming a computer to perform that sort of conversion.50 The particular method
involved putting the BCD number into a shift register and performing a sequence of
operations that would convert it into its binary equivalent.51
¶13
The Benson court held the algorithm unpatentable due to its inclusion in the group
of scientific truths, abstract principles, fundamental truths, mental processes, abstract
intellectual concepts, and hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature as opposed to
patentable applications (“a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge
of scientific truth,” or “an application of the law of nature to a new and useful end”).52
The key was that the algorithm was not tied to any particular application. Any future
computer programmer, working in any area, would need permission if he or she wished
to use that method of conversion. As the court stated,
Here the ‘process’ claim is so abstract and sweeping as to cover both
known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary conversion. The end
use may (1) vary from the operation of a train to verification of drivers’
licenses to researching the law books for precedents and (2) be performed
through any existing machinery or future-devised machinery or without
any apparatus.53
The court made plain that patents should not apply to such “basic tools of scientific and
technological work.”54
¶14
Parker v. Flook,55 the Supreme Court’s next case on patentable subject matter,
likewise held a software invention unpatentable. However, the process claimed in Flook
was not as wide-ranging as Benson. Flook concerned a method for calculating updated
alarm limits during catalytic conversion processes.56 During such a conversion process,
49

See id. at 67.
See id. at 66-67 (quoting earlier Supreme Court cases).
51
The claimed method was: “The method of converting signals from binary coded decimal form into
binary which comprises the steps of (1) storing the binary coded decimal signals in a reentrant shift
register, (2) shifting the signals to the right by at least three places, until there is a binary ‘1’ in the second
position of said register, (3) masking out said binary ‘1’ in said second position of said register, (4) adding
a binary ‘1’ to the first position of said register, (5) shifting the signals to the left by two positions, (6)
adding a ‘1’ to said first position, and (7) shifting the signals to the right by at least three positions in
preparation for a succeeding binary ‘1’ in the second position of said register.” Id. at 73 (quoting patent
application).
52
Id. at 66-71.
53
Id. at 68.
54
Id. at 67.
55
437 U.S. 584 (1978).
56
Id. at 585-86. The claimed process was: “A method for updating the value of at least one alarm limit
on at least one process variable involved in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of
hydrocarbons wherein said alarm limit has a current value of Bo+K wherein Bo is the current alarm base
and K is a predetermined alarm offset which comprises: (1) Determining the present value of said process
variable, said present value being defined as PVL; (2) Determining a new alarm base B1, using the
following equation: B[1]=Bo(1.0<v1>minF)+PVL(F)
where F is a predetermined number greater than zero and less than 1.0; (3) Determining an updated alarm
limit which is defined as B1+GK; and thereafter (4) Adjusting said alarm limit to said updated alarm limit
value.” Id. at 596-97.
50
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problems often develop if a variable (such as the temperature, pressure rate, or flow rate)
exceeds a threshold—the alarm limit.57 The alarm limits, however, can change during the
process; for example, the temperature alarm limit at the start of the process could be 150
degrees, but later might change to 200 degrees.58 The only novel feature of the method
for calculating an alarm limit was a mathematical formula.59 The Court held that “a claim
for an improved method of calculation, even when tied to a specific end use, is
unpatentable subject matter under § 101.”60 Although Benson and Flook stated that the
mere use of a computer or an algorithm would not necessarily make an invention
unpatentable,61 the cases threw great doubt on the patentability of abstract subject matter
such as software and business methods.
¶15
The Court’s next opinion took a more expansive approach to patent subject
matter, although in a much different field of endeavor. Diamond v. Chakrabarty
addressed the issue of “whether a live, human-made micro-organism is patentable subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”62 Chakrabarty held that a genetically engineered oileating microorganism was patentable, which set the stage for the widespread patenting of
biotechnology inventions and discoveries. The patent office had denied the application on
two grounds: “(1) that microorganisms are ‘products of nature,’ and (2) that as living
things they are not patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”63 The Supreme
Court reasoned that the micro-organism was not a “product of nature” because it did not
occur naturally in that form, but rather represented a new organism created by the
addition of genetic material to an existing micro-organism.64 The Court also declined to
exclude living things from patentable subject matter, reasoning that Congress intended
(by drafting § 101 of the Patent Act to include broad categories, prefaced by the
comprehensive word any) for patentable subject matter to “include anything under the
sun that is made by man.”65 Chakrabarty did, however, repeat the rule from Benson and
Flook that “the laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not
patentable.66
¶16
Returning to software in Diamond v. Diehr,67 the Court took a decidedly different
approach than in Benson and Flook by holding that patentable subject matter included
claims encompassing the use of a computer. Diehr concerned a process for curing
rubber, which consisted of constantly measuring certain temperatures, then feeding that
information into a computer, which would calculate when to terminate the curing
process.68
57

Id. at 594-95.
Id. at 594-95.
59
Id. at 585.
60
Id. at 595.
61
Flook, 437 U.S. at 595.
62
447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
63
Id. at 306.
64
Id. at 310 (“Here, by contrast, the patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different
characteristics from any found in nature.”).
65
Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952).
66
Id. at 309.
67
450 U.S. 175 (1981).
68
The invention as claimed in Claim 1 of the application: “A method of operating a rubber-molding
press for precision molded compounds with the aid of a digital computer, comprising: providing said
computer with a data base for said press including at least, natural logarithm conversion data (ln), the
58
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The Diehr court distinguished both Benson and Flook on the grounds that the
claimed inventions in those cases were simply mathematical processes, not tied to any
specific application.69 In Benson, the
sole practical application of the algorithm was in connection with the
programming of a general purpose digital computer. We defined “algorithm” as
a “procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem,” and we
concluded that such an algorithm, or mathematical formula, is like a law of
nature, which cannot be the subject of a patent.70

¶18

In Flook, the claimed invention, although used in connection with manufacturing,
was a numerical process not tied to any particular use. An “alarm limit” is simply a
number and the Court concluded that the application sought to protect a formula for
computing this number. Using this formula, the updated alarm limit could be calculated
if several other variables were known. The application, however, did not purport to
explain how these other variables were to be determined, nor did it purport “to contain
any disclosure relating to the chemical processes at work, the monitoring of process
variables, or the means of setting off an alarm or adjusting an alarm system. All that it
provides is a formula for computing an updated alarm limit.”71
¶19
Since Diehr in 1981, the Supreme Court has not decided any cases on the scope of
patent subject matter. In that vacuum, the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (U.S.C.C.P.A), in a series of cases, formulated the Freeman-Walter-Abele test
for the patentability of software: “(1) determining whether the claim recites an
‘algorithm’ within the meaning of Benson, then (2) determining whether that algorithm is
‘applied in any manner to physical elements or process steps.’”72 The Federal Circuit,
which succeeded the U.S.C.C.P.A. as the federal appellate court with jurisdiction over
patent cases, has continued to struggle with the issue of patentable subject matter.73
Various cases relied on such requirements as a physical application, steps in addition to
the algorithm, or a physical transformation.74
¶20
The Federal Circuit then took a much broader approach in In re Alappat.75 The
Alappat court abandoned the various complex requirements that previous cases had used
activation energy constant (C) unique to each batch of said compound being molded, and a constant (x)
dependent upon the geometry of the particular mold of the press, initiating an interval timer in said
computer upon the closure of the press for monitoring the elapsed time of said closure, constantly
determining the temperature (Z) of the mold at a location closely adjacent to the mold cavity in the press
during molding, constantly providing the computer with the temperature (Z), repetitively calculating in the
computer, at frequent intervals during each cure, the Arrhenius equation for reaction time during the cure,
which is ln v equ CZ+x where v is the total required cure time, repetitively comparing in the computer at
said frequent intervals during the cure each said calculation of the total required cure time calculated with
the Arrhenius equation and said elapsed time, and opening the press automatically when a comparison
indicates equivalence.” Id. at 181 (quoting claim 1 of patent application).
69
Id.
70
Id. at 185-86.
71
Id.
72
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 958-59 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing test formulated in In re Freeman, 573 F.2d
1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 905-07
(C.C.P.A. 1982)).
73
See, e.g., In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 838-39 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
74
Cf. Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
75
33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
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to mark the boundaries of patentable subject matter. Rather, the court looked to a much
simpler test: whether the claimed invention produced a “useful, concrete and tangible
result.”76 The invention at issue transformed a data set in order to configure electronic
circuitry to convert the input data to an oscilloscope to a form that would give a
smoother-looking image.77 The court decided this process was indeed a “useful, concrete
and tangible” result, and so within patentable subject matter.78
¶21
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.79 upheld a less
tangible invention. The invention in State Street was a data processing system for
implementing an investment structure for mutual funds.80 By pooling their assets in a
single investment portfolio, several mutual funds could save on administration expenses
but retain tax advantages. 81 By necessity, the complex system was implemented by
software.82 State Street followed Alappat in holding that the system was patentable
subject matter because it produced a “useful, concrete, and tangible result.”83 The court
relied on the broad language of § 101: “The repetitive use of the expansive term ‘any’ in
§ 101 shows Congress’s intent not to place any restrictions on the subject matter for
which a patent may be obtained beyond those specifically recited in § 101.”84 Although
State Street applied the same test as Alappat, it applied the test more broadly. State Street
included within patentable subject matter an invention with numbers as input and
numbers as output, going beyond Diehr (in which the end result was cured rubber) and
Alappat (in which the end result was a clearer picture on the oscilloscope screen).
¶22
The Federal Circuit stuck with the “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test in
AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.85 AT&T rejected the argument that the
process at issue fell outside patentable subject matter because it consisted simply of using
a logical process to determine the value of a number used in a billing method, and was
simply an unpatentable mathematical algorithm.86 AT&T held that as long as the claimed
method produced a “useful, concrete and tangible result” it was patentable, even though it
might simply consist of manipulating numbers.87 The court held the application of the
numerical process to be specific enough to be patentable: “AT&T’s claimed process
employs subscribers’ and call recipients’ PICs as data, applies Boolean algebra to those
data to determine the value of the PIC indicator, and applies that value through switching
and recording mechanisms to create a signal useful for billing purposes.”88
¶23
The Supreme Court then appeared to take the reins from the Federal Circuit,
granting certiorari in a case that promised to give guidance on the scope of patentable

76

Id. at 1544.
Id. at 1543-45.
78
Id. at 1544.
79
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
80
Id. at 1370.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 1373.
84
Id.
85
172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
86
Id. at 1358-59.
87
Id. at 1355 (“Since the process of manipulation of numbers is a fundamental part of computer
technology, we have had to reexamine the rules that govern the patentability of such technology.”).
88
Id. at 1358.
77
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subject matter, Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.89
Metabolite was not a software or business method case, but it presented a nice issue about
the distinction between claiming a law of nature and claiming an application of the law of
nature.90 The patent in question claimed a method of “correlating an elevated level of
total homocysteine in . . . body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate”; in other
words, diagnosing a vitamin deficiency (of folate and cobalamin) by checking the level of
a correlated amino acid.91 The inventors discovered that a high level of the amino acid in
a person’s blood corresponds to low levels of the vitamins in the person’s system.92 The
method would seem to encompass natural phenomena: if there was a correlation between
the vitamin level and the level of the amino acid, then that correlation could be used to
diagnose the vitamin deficiency from the low level of the amino acid.93 Metabolite,
however, made inventive arguments that granting a patent on the diagnostic method still
left open other uses of the natural phenomenon.94 As Metabolite argued in its briefs, one
could use the principle the other way around. If there is a correlation between high levels
of the amino acid and low levels of Vitamin B, then one could reduce levels of the amino
acid by taking Vitamin B. This would have health benefits, because high levels of that
particular amino acid can have a deleterious effect.
¶24
After taking briefs and hearing oral arguments, the Supreme Court did not decide
the case on the merits.95 Rather, it dismissed the certiorari petition as improvidently
granted, apparently taking the view that the patentability issue, which had not been fully
addressed in the lower courts, was not ripe for review on the limited record before the
Court.96 Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, dissented from the
dismissal, taking the position that the Court should have decided the case and should
have ruled that the claim was beyond the scope of patentable subject matter.97 Justice
Breyer conceded that the “category of non patentable ‘[p]henomena of nature,’ like the
categories of ‘mental processes’ and ‘abstract intellectual concepts,’ is not easy to
define.”98 Yet, Justice Breyer noted, intellectual property law is replete with key
distinctions that have difficult borders.99 In particular, he quoted Judge Learned Hand for
the proposition that the fundamental distinction in copyright law between copyrightable
expression and noncopyrightable ideas “wherever it is drawn, will seem arbitrary.”100
Justice Breyer would have held the invention unpatentable, because it merely required
someone to think about the results of an unpatented test, by correlating the results of the
amino acid test to the scientific discovery about the relationship between those results
and vitamin B levels: “Claim 13’s process instructs the user to (1) obtain test results and

89

548 U.S. 124 (2006).
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
See Brief for Respondents at 75, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124
(2006) (No. 04-607).
95
548 U.S. 124 (2007).
96
Id.
97
Id. at 134-38 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
98
Id. at 134.
99
Id.
100
Id. (quoting Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.)).
90
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(2) think about them.”101 Breyer noted that the claim might have met the Federal
Circuit’s test for patentable subject matter, whether the process produces a “useful,
concrete and tangible result.” But, he leveled a broadside at the test: the Supreme Court
“has never made such a statement and, if taken literally, the statement would cover
instances where this Court has held the contrary.”102
¶25
To sum up, the Supreme Court issued two opinions, Benson and Flook, holding
that particular software inventions were not patentable, while carefully stating that some
computer-implemented inventions could be patentable. Chakrabarty held that a
genetically engineered micro-organism was patentable, using broad language. Diehr, on
facts not greatly different from Flook, held a software invention to be patentable. The
lower courts next took up the cause, first struggling to form the Freeman-Walter-Abele
test: (1) determining whether the claim recites an “algorithm” within the meaning of
Benson, then (2) determining whether that algorithm is “applied in any manner to
physical elements or process steps.”103 The Federal Circuit then abandoned that
restrictive approach, deciding instead, under State Street and AT&T, that an invention
included patentable subject matter if it yielded a “useful, concrete and tangible result.”104
Under this approach, the key to patentability was not the subject matter requirement, but
rather the substantive requirements that an invention be novel and nonobvious. The
Supreme Court passed up the opportunity to clarify matters in Metabolite, but several
members of the court expressed great skepticism that the open door of State Street was
consistent with the earlier Supreme Court cases.
¶26
The skepticism expressed in Metabolite about State Street’s broad approach to
patentable subject matter reflected increasing skepticism about software and business
method patents among academics, engineers, industry, and beyond. Software patents
have been criticized on many grounds. Unlike industries like pharmaceuticals, where
patents may be necessary to finance the millions required to bring a drug through
research, development, and FDA approval, a software or business invention may be
relatively inexpensive to develop.105 As noted above, software business patents have also
been criticized because their claims are often abstract and hence, difficult to interpret and
apply, and because the prior art in relevant fields can be difficult to locate, making it
difficult to determine if the application represents a patentable innovation.

101

Id. at 136.
Id.
103
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 958-59 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing test formulated in In re Freeman, 573 F.2d
1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 905-07
(C.C.P.A. 1982)).
104
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
105
See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1005-06 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Mayer, J., dissenting) (“Although
patents are not a prerequisite to business innovation, they are of undeniable importance in promoting
technological advances. For example, the pharmaceutical industry relies on patent protection in order to
recoup the large sums it invests to develop life-saving and life-enhancing drugs . . . Business method
patents, unlike those granted for pharmaceuticals and other products, offer rewards that are grossly
disproportionate to the costs of innovation. In contrast to technological endeavors, business innovations
frequently involve little or no investment in research and development.”) (citing Jay Dratler, Jr., Alice in
Wonderland Meets the U.S. Patent System, 38 AKRON L. REV. 299, 313-14 (2005)).
102
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II. BILSKI: THE MACHINE-OR-TRANSFORMATION TEST
The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc in In re Bilski,106 announced a test intended to
prevent a patent from preempting a “fundamental idea,” meaning a law of nature, a
natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea.107 The claimed invention was a method of
hedging risks in the commodities field using derivative contracts.108 Under State Street
and AT&T, such a method would be patentable if it yields a useful, concrete and tangible
result.109 The Federal Circuit in Bilski stated that the “useful, concrete and tangible” test
was “inadequate.”110 Rather, the court formulated a test drawn from language in Benson,
Flook, and Diehr. Under Bilski, a process is patentable only if “(1) it is tied to a
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different
state or thing.”
¶28
This section looks at Bilski from two angles, legal reasoning and future effects.
Bilski’s analysis is hardly iron-clad, and the opinion seems result-oriented. It reads as
though the Federal Circuit had determined its destination (announcing the newly
applicable test) and treated the analysis as an obstacle course. The opinion gives little
weight to the very statute it is interpreting or to the facts of the relevant Supreme Court
cases, and it develops a test that heeds some, but not all of the language of those cases.
Concededly, in a common law system, a landmark case must sometimes extract itself
from the established precedent. As precedent for patent law going forward, Bilski
(despite its analytical shortcomings), holds great promise. The test it formulates gives the
courts a formidable tool to limit the scope of patents. Although Bilski’s doctrinal impact
is limited to patentable subject matter, its influence may be even greater in other areas of
patent law that, taken together may play a greater role in limiting the scope of
questionable patent claims.
¶27

A. Bilski’s Legal Analysis
¶29

Bilski’s principal concern was preventing overly broad patents: “The question
before us then is whether Applicants’ claim recites a fundamental principle and, if so,
whether it would pre-empt substantially all uses of that fundamental principle if
allowed.”111 The court looked to the idea of preemption to distinguish Benson, where the

106

545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 951-52 n.5.
108
The text of the claim at issue: “A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity
sold by a commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of: (a) initiating a series of transactions
between said commodity provider and consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers purchase said
commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of
said consumer; (b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk position to
said consumers; and (c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and said market
participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of market participant transactions balances the risk
position of said series of consumer transactions.” In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949 (citing claim 1 of U.S.
Patent Application Serial No. 08/833,892).
109
See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959. State Street held “that the transformation of data, representing discrete
dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share price,
constitutes a patent-eligible invention because it produces ‘a useful, concrete and tangible result.’” See id.
(quoting State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373).
110
Id. at 959-60.
111
Id. at 954.
107
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claimed conversion algorithm would be useful in many areas of computer programming,
from Diehr, where the use of an algorithm was limited to curing rubber.112 Ideas and
principles are not patentable; applications of ideas and principles are patentable. Bilski
sought to draw the line by requiring that the process be applied specifically, by being tied
to a particular machine or by transforming something particular. The Bilski court reached
that test only after navigating a number of objections.
¶30
The first impediment was the governing statute. The statute defines “process” in
broad terms: “The term ‘process’ means process, art or method, and includes a new use
of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”113 That
definition contains none of the restrictions that the court’s new test included. But the
court dismissed the statutory definition: “this provision is unhelpful given that the
definition itself uses the term ‘process.’”114 Courts often struggle to interpret statutory
definitions, to fit the language of the statute to the legislative history or underlying
purpose of the statute or the governing case law. But, for the court simply to dismiss the
governing legal rule as “unhelpful” is quite unusual. Substantively, it is a weak objection
that the definition of “process” is unhelpful because it uses the word “process” within the
definition itself. Such a recursive115 definition occurs in other parts of the patent statute,
such as the immediately preceding definition: “The term ‘invention’ means invention or
discovery.”116 Recursive definitions are widely used in mathematics and software – so
the court’s dismissal of such definitions in a case central to software patents is ironic.
¶31
The court also declined to discuss the applicability of its most recent case on
patentable subject matter, In re Nuijten,117 on the ground that “that decision primarily
concerned whether a claim to an electronic signal was drawn to a patent-eligible
manufacture.”118 So although the statute was not guiding, recent precedent could be
ignored because it interpreted a slightly different provision of the same statute. Although
Nuijten technically addressed a different phrase (in the same sentence), the underlying
policy issues are the same—how broad patentable subject matter should extend—and
simply ignoring recent precedent is again an unusual move for a court in such an
important case.
¶32
The Bilski court next made some fine maneuvers in order to characterize the
machine-or-transformation test as one drawn from Supreme Court precedent. The
language drawn from Flook was placed in a footnote and offered up tentatively at best:
“An argument can be made [that the Supreme] Court has only recognized a process as
within the statutory definition when it either was tied to a particular apparatus or operated
to change materials to a ‘different state or thing.’”119 Benson had referred to the machineor-transformation inquiry only as “the clue to the patentability of a process claim.”120

112

Id. at 953-54.
35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006).
114
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 951 n.3.
115
Lorie Graham & Stephen McJohn, Cognition, Law, Stories, 10 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 255 (2009)
(discussing recursive reasoning).
116
35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006).
117
500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
118
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 951.
119
Id. at 954 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 n.9 (1978)).
120
Id. (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)).
113
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More directly, the Court stated in Benson that it was not holding that the machineor-transformation inquiry was the exclusive test for patentability of processes:
It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or
apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a ‘different state or
thing.’ We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet
the requirements of our prior precedents.121

¶34

In Flook, the Court again stated that it assumed that meeting the machine-ortransformation inquiry was not necessarily a requirement for patentability of processes.122
But the Bilski court placed great weight on the fact that this qualification was not
repeated in Diehr, when it quoted Benson’s language about the machine-ortransformation inquiry being “the clue” to patentability.123 But the fact that the Court did
not repeat that reasoning a third time, in a case where the question did not arise, did not
imply that the Court had abandoned it.
¶35
The Bilski court also specifically declined to reason about the facts of the
Supreme Court cases on point:
Analogizing to the facts of Diehr or Benson is of limited usefulness because the
more challenging process claims of the twenty-first century are seldom so clearly
limited in scope as the highly specific, plainly corporeal industrial manufacturing
process of Diehr; nor are they typically as broadly claimed or purely abstract and
mathematical as the algorithm of Benson.124

¶36

The facts of Supreme Court cases are likewise rarely so pointedly ignored. The
distinction again is hardly robust. The process claim at issue in Bilski was hardly a
cutting edge 21st-century technology. Rather, the application had been made in 1997, for
a method of hedging risk125—a type of business method that preceded by centuries the
software inventions in the Supreme Court cases.
B. Evaluation of the Machine-or-Transformation Test

¶37

In short, the Federal Circuit in Bilski chose to adopt a rule that the Supreme Court
had specifically declined to make a general rule, chose to ignore the facts of the Supreme
Court cases and its own most recent case on point, and chose to set aside the statute’s
definition of the word that governed the case. It can at least be said, however, that the
court did not hide its footprints. It took these steps explicitly, even though Bilski’s
doctrinal footing may be weak. Most importantly, Bilski was addressing an issue—the
governing test for patentable subject matter—that has defied courts and commentators for
decades. Time has only made clearer what a patent treatise author described in 1986 as
“the awkward distinctions and seemingly irreconcilable results of the case law since
Benson, including the Supreme Court’s decisions in Parker v. Flook and Diamond v.
121

Id. at 956 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 71).
Id. (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 589 n.9).
123
Id. (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981)).
124
Id. at 954.
125
Id. at 949.
122
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Diehr.”126 A little analytical weakness will not undermine the case, if the court has
fashioned a test that can meet the challenge.
The Bilski test does not provide straightforward guidance. Although it sets out an
apparently clear structure, much interpretation will be needed to define the key terms it
uses. But, although the test will not necessarily enable courts to easily decide future
cases, it may give them better guidance than previous tests by providing a firm policy
framework.
As Bilski put it, the governing test for patentability of processes is whether “(1) it
is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a
different state or thing.”127 The test seeks to prevent preemption of fundamental
principles by limiting the scope of patent claims, requiring that the claim be limited either
to use on a particular machine or to a use that transforms a particular thing.128 The test
seeks to exclude such abstract inventions as pure software, mental processes, or abstract
business methods with applications in many fields of endeavor. The words of the test,
however, will not draw the lines sought.
The first limit is that the invention be tied to “a particular machine or
apparatus.”129 That formulation did not address a key question – whether a general
purpose computer would qualify as “a particular machine.” Rather, Bilski left that thorny
question open for future cases. If a general purpose computer qualifies as “a particular
machine,” then the potential set of patentable software inventions is nearly limitless,
because any software could be claimed as long as it could run on a general purpose
computer. Bilski did note that in Benson the conversion algorithm was not patentable
although it was claimed for use on a general purpose computer. 130 That was not a
limitation, on the theory that the algorithm had no practical use other than on a computer,
so the tie to a computer was not limiting. 131 But that leaves little guidance for when
limiting the invention to use on a general purpose computer would be sufficient – or
whether it would be sufficient to limit it to a particular type of use on a computer, or use
in part of the computer, such as on a specialized mathematics processor.
Beyond leaving open that well-known question, the limit to “a particular
machine” fails as a literal matter even with more abstract claims. For example, it is
generally agreed that pure mental processes are not patentable.132 But one could draft a
patent claim on a mental process that is tied to a particular machine—the human brain.
After all, the brain is a machine133 – the most complex machine known.134 A diagnostic
method, a calculating process, a method of determining how to hedge risk, the conversion
algorithm in Benson—any abstract unpatentable process could be drafted as a process
126

Donald S. Chisum, The Future of Software Protection: The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT.
L. REV. 959, 961 (1986).
127
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954.
128
Id. at 954-56.
129
Id. at 954.
130
Id. at 955.
131
Id. at 953-54 (discussing Benson).
132
See, e.g., In re Comiskey, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 400, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1641 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 13, 2009).
133
See, e.g., NORMAN DOIDGE, The BRAIN THAT CHANGES ITSELF 12, 13, 47, 250 (Penguin 2007)
(describing view of brain as complex machine, made of parts that perform specific functions and exist in
genetically predetermined or hardwired location).
134
“The brain, as the most complex machine on the planet, remained unexplored in the computational
sense.” Igor Aleksander, A Brain in the Hand, 432 NATURE 18 (Nov. 4, 2004).
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performed with a human brain. Of course, no court would hold the process patentable,
but only if the literal term in the Bilski test (“a particular machine”) is interpreted in light
of the underlying rationale behind the test. An application for a patent on a process
performed with a human brain will be held unpatentable not because the brain is not a
machine, but rather because it is not the sort of machine envisioned by the machine-ortransformation test. This means that to determine the scope of the machine-ortransformation test requires differentiating between different machines based on the
underlying policy – avoiding preemption of fundamental principles.
¶42
What constitutes a “machine” for purposes of the machine-or-transformation test
will likewise require considerable interpretation with respect to biotech patents. A cell of
a plant or animal is a “machine” for patent law purposes.135 A cell, like such classic
machines as a steam engine, consumes fuel and performs work. If a cell is a machine for
purposes of the Bilski test, then it would be easier for inventions covering biological
processes to qualify. Diagnostic processes, which might be considered as unpatentable
abstract ideas, could be drafted as tied to particular categories of cells.
¶43
The other prong of the machine-or-transformation test will likewise require
considerable interpretation before its extent is at all clear. A process, even if not tied to a
particular machine, may be patentable if “it transforms a particular article into a different
state or thing.”136 This raises a thorny question: what constitutes a “transformation”? To
take again an extreme example, this could be read to make patentable any software
invention. Computers exist only to change into different states. The classic conception
of a general purpose computer is the Turing machine, “a mathematical model of a device
that changes its internal state and reads from, writes on, and moves, a potentially infinite
tape, all in accordance with its present state.”137 Computer programming, at its core, uses
computer instructions to change the state of the memory, registers and other devices to
perform tasks. “State” is so central to computing that the word has taken on related
vernacular meanings: to ask a hacker “What’s your state?” means ‘What are you doing?’
or ‘What are you about to do?’138 Software is the art of transforming one state to another
(often many times in succession)—so even the most abstract software invention would
also literally meet the second prong of the Bilski test.
¶44
The word “transform” seems much simpler than it would be in application to actual
inventions. The Bilski court gave little clue as to what would constitute the requisite
“transformation” (as opposed to a more modest “change”).
The machine-ortransformation test, on its face, requires a determination of whether there is a
transformation or not. This is a binary determination, but patent law could learn a lesson
135

See Amgen Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 902 F.2d 1532, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954.
137
IBM DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING 710 (10th ed. 1993).
138
The definition of “state” from the New Hacker’s Dictionary:
1. Condition, situation. “What's the state of your latest hack?” “It's winning away.” “The system tried to
read and write the disk simultaneously and got into a totally wedged state.” The standard question “What's
your state?” means “What are you doing?” or “What are you about to do?” Typical answers are “about to
gronk out”, or “hungry”. Another standard question is “What's the state of the world?”, meaning “What's
new?” or “What's going on?”. The more terse and humorous way of asking these questions would be
“State-p?”. Another way of phrasing the first question under sense 1 would be “state-p latest hack?”. 2.
Information being maintained in non-permanent memory (electronic or human).
NEW HACKER’S DICTIONARY 425 (3d. ed. 1996), available at
http://www.ccil.org/jargon/jargon_34.html.
136
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here from copyright law, that the concept of transformation is more complex. Under the
copyright law, a transformative use of a protected work is likely to qualify as a “fair use”
that does not infringe the author’s rights.139 A parody version of the song Pretty Woman
qualified for fair use largely because the use was held “transformative,” a use that “adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message.”140 But the Supreme Court has indicated that, in
copyright, determination of whether a use is transformative is not an all-or-nothing
question. Rather, there is a spectrum: “the more transformative the new work, the less
will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a
finding of fair use.”141 The fluid nature of “transformation,” however, has made it a tool
rather than an obstruction. Courts are given flexibility to implement the underlying
polices of fair use, such as balancing the interests of copyright holders against the
expressive interests of other creators interested in building on or criticizing their works.142
Indeed, courts have held uses to be “transformative” even when they do not really change
the nature of the copyrighted work.143 Thumbnail versions of photographs displayed by
Google to users searching for images were held transformative144—but not because there
was creativity in making the small, low-resolution, and purposefully inferior images.
Rather, the use was transformative because the images were used for a different purpose
than what the original author intended.145 The thumbnail images were used in order to
facilitate searching for images online—a “transformative” use only in the sense that
Google made a productive use of the images that was so different than the copyright
holder’s use that it did not threaten the market for the copyrighted work.146 Similarly,
putting student papers into a database used for detecting plagiarism was held to be a
“transformative” use.147 The papers themselves were not transformed; no new creative
elements were added. But the use was sufficiently different that the “transformative”
label was held applicable.148 As courts apply the same term in the different context of the
machine-or-transformation test, the meaning of “transform” may come to depend not
literally on whether changes were made to the relevant subject matter, but rather whether
granting patent protection on the claimed invention would hazard preemption of a
fundamental principle.
¶45
The interpretation of “transformation” will play an important role in the scope of
patentable subject matter. The answer will be particularly important in biotechnology,
where there are many processes that do not make physical changes, but have important
secondary effects. Not long after Bilski, the Federal Circuit decided a case raising
precisely this issue, Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec.149 The patented
139

See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
See A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007).
144
See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165.
145
See id.
146
Id.
147
See iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 640.
148
Id.
149
304 F. App’x. 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
140
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invention comprised immunizing mammals in a treatment group of mammals and
comparing the incidence of various disorders.150 Such a broad claim would seem to be
unpatentable as embracing an abstract idea, rather than its application. But, reaching that
conclusion in the terms of the machine-or-transformation test is not so straightforward,
because there was arguably a transformation involved: immunizing the animals would
change them. The court did not analyze the question, but instead summarily affirmed the
case without discussing how the machine-or-transformation test applied.151 That
summary treatment may reflect not how straightforward the machine-or-transformation
test is to apply, but rather how complex, meaning that although the panel agreed on the
result, they did not agree on the reasoning leading to the result. As noted shortly
thereafter, the “short opinion may well be the only consensus reached amongst the
panel.”152 Provided that courts approach the machine-or-transformation test as a guide to
implement policy, rather than as a rigid rule, it may prove a formidable tool in an area
that has defied attempts by courts and commentators to create a uniform rule.153
III. ECHOES OF LEARNED HAND: THE FORCE OF THE ANTI-PREEMPTION POLICY ON
PATENT SCOPE
¶46

The Bilski test, while concise, will require considerable interpretation in its
application to particular cases, and may well apply differently in different fields of
technology, such as mechanical engineering, software applications, and biotechnology.
That indefiniteness and variability, however, may prove to be a considerable advantage.

A. Comparison to Copyright’s Idea/Expression Rule
¶47

Justice Breyer, in dissenting from the dismissal of certiorari in Metabolite, had
urged the Court to address the boundaries of patentable subject matter.154 He quoted
Flook for the proposition that “[t]he line between a patentable ‘process’ and an
unpatentable ‘principle’ is not always clear.”155 He then quoted Judge Learned Hand for
the proposition that line-drawing in copyright is likewise elusive: “[W]e are as aware as

150

The relevant claim: “A method of determining whether an immunization schedule affects the
incidence or severity of a chronic immune-mediated disorder in a treatment group of mammals, relative to a
control group of mammals, which comprises: immunizing mammals in the treatment group of mammals
with one or more doses of one or more immunogens, according to said immunization schedule, and
comparing the incidence, prevalence, frequency or severity of said chronic immune-mediated disorder or
the level of a marker of such a disorder, in the treatment group, with that in the control group.” U.S. Patent
No. 5,723,283, at [Claim 1] (filed May 31, 1995).
151
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, 304 F. App’x 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
152
Dennis Crouch, Federal Circuit Invalidates Immunization Patent for Lack of Patentable Subject
Matter, PATENTLY-O, Dec. 19, 2008, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/12/federal-circu-2.html.
153
The Federal Circuit’s opinion read, in its entirety: “In light of our decision in In re Bilski, 545 F.3d
943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment that these claims
are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Dr. Classen’s claims are neither ‘tied to a particular machine or
apparatus’ nor do they ‘transform[] a particular article into a different state or thing.’ Id. at 954. Therefore
we affirm.” Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., v. Biogen Idec, 304 F. App’x 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
154
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. at 134-35 (Breyer, J., dissenting from
dismissal of cert. petition).
155
Id. at 134.
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anyone that the line [between copyrightable expressions and non-copyrightable ideas],
wherever it is drawn, will seem arbitrary.”156
¶48
It is well-established that copyright does not protect ideas, but rather the
expression of ideas.157 However, there is no bright line between ideas and expression.
Rather, courts used the “abstractions” analysis set out by Learned Hand.158 The key
factor is “whether giving protection to the copied element would reduce the ability of
others to create works, or whether others are left with plenty of alternatives.”159 This
underlying policy is quite similar to the underlying policy for patentable subject matter in
Bilski: whether patent protection for the claim would preempt a fundamental principle or
is simply one application of the principle, leaving other applications free for others to
use.160
¶49
The idea/expression distinction, although vague, has proved of great value in
copyright law. The flexibility of the test permits it to apply to the broad range of works
that are subject to copyright protection. When analyzing creative works (which receive a
high level of copyright protection) courts can distinguish between idea and expression at
a relatively high level of abstraction. When analyzing functional or factual works (which
receive less, if any, protection), courts draw the line at a lower level. It was not copyright
infringement to copy many specific elements from a book about a historical event, the
Hindenburg disaster, “such as the age and birthplace of the saboteur, various specific
pertinent details about the airship and its crew, a warning letter from a Mrs. Rauch,
Germany’s ambassador discounting threats of sabotage, even the smuggling of monkeys
aboard another zeppelin in the fleet.”161 Likewise, for functional works like computer
software, copyright permits copying at a much closer level than would be permitted for
such creative works as novels or movies.162
¶50
By focusing the policy analysis on preemption, Bilski could likewise allow for
appropriate differentiation between different subject matter areas. Commentators have
found that attempts to apply uniform rules across patent law can lead to perverse
results.163 Attempts to create “a unified patent system that provides technology-neutral
protection to all kinds of technologies” can actually create “conceptual shackles.”164
156

Id. at 134 (quoting Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930).
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”).
158
See Nichols, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures, 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.
1936).
159
STEPHEN MCJOHN, COPYRIGHT: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS, Chapter 5 (3d ed. Aspen Pub.
2009).
160
See discussion, supra, at notes 98-102.
161
MCJOHN, supra note 159, at 84 (discussing Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972,
979 n.6 (2d Cir. 1980)).
162
See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
163
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003). See also
Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV.
1 (2001).
164
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1155, 1157 (2002) (suggesting that standards in biotech and software should be tailored to relevant
policies). See also id. at 1156 (“In biotechnology cases, the Federal Circuit has bent over backwards to find
biotechnological inventions nonobvious, even if the prior art demonstrates a clear plan for producing the
invention. On the other hand, the court has imposed stringent enablement and written description
157
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Making preemption a key part of the application of patent subject matter requirement
allows courts to take into account the varying policies in different fields. In biotech, for
instance, the hazards of preemption are most likely to arise where an inventor has
discovered a scientific fact, and the invention may preempt applications of that fact (as
was true of the diagnostic process in Metabolite165). In software, by contrast, the
preemption risk is more likely to be that someone develops a process with applications in
many different fields (like the BCD-to-binary conversion method at issue in Benson).
¶51
Under Bilski, some issued patents may be invalid, and pending applications may
be denied, where they claim only pure processes.166 This could cut back on patents in
such subject matter as software (which is built from processes), business methods (like
the method of hedging risks with derivatives in Bilski), and biotech (such as methods of
diagnosis and treatment dealing with genetic information). On the other hand, many
software, business method, and biotech inventions will be patentable, because they are
linked to a machine or transform something. Not long after Bilski, the Federal Circuit
held that a method for marketing a product was not patentable subject matter.167 A trial
court held a claimed method of fulfilling orders for a product to be an unpatentable idea
because what it boiled down to was “if at first you don’t succeed, try, try again.”168 For
many inventions, however, the effect of Bilski will be not to bar patent protection, but
rather limit the scope of the claims. Patent lawyers will take great care to include either a
machine or transformation in their process claims.
¶52
But Bilski’s greatest effect will likely go beyond the issue of patentable subject
matter. Even with Bilski’s restrictions, patentable subject matter remains very broad.
The machine-or-transformation test will be relatively easily satisfied for most inventions.
As a thought experiment, one could look back at some of history’s most important
innovations169 and ask whether a patent lawyer could have drafted a claim that satisfied
the machine-or-transformation test. Some would not, such as the number zero. But, such
innovations as farming, the printing press, and the computer would meet the test—and so
would have been patentable. But the key question would have been the scope of the
patent. The inventor of a printing press would not have been able to enforce a patent
against all other means of printing; only ones that fell within the scope of the patent
claims. There are plenty of patent law doctrines that can function to limit patent
protection to reasonable breadth.
¶53
The machine-or-transformation test, in this light, jibes well with the changes in
the law on patentability. An invention is patentable only if it is not obvious.170 But
showing obviousness has sometimes been difficult with software and business method
patents because prior art in such generally applicable areas is often not as readily
requirements on biotechnology patents that do not show up in other disciplines. In computer software cases,
the situation is reversed. The Federal Circuit has essentially excused software inventions from compliance
with the enablement and best mode requirements, but has done so in a way that raises serious questions
about how stringently it will read the nonobviousness requirements.”).
165
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006).
166
Cf. Ben Klemens, The Rise Of The Information Processing Patent, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
1 (2008) (advocating using patentable subject matter to bar pure software patents).
167
In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
168
See Perfect Web Tech. Inc. v. InfoUSA Inc., 2008 WL 6153736 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
169
For the opinions of a wide range of scientists and other thinkers on the most important innovations,
see THE GREATEST INVENTIONS OF THE PAST 2,000 YEARS (John Brockman, ed.) (2000).
170
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
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searchable as in more narrow, defined fields like chemistry. Various efforts have been
made to collect examples of prior art to prevent the issuance or enforcement of software
patents that do not represent a genuine innovation.171 The difficulty of finding prior art
fueled the debate over software patents. The Electronic Frontier Foundation identified a
number of patents issued that apparently covered quite basic internet technology.172 The
Supreme Court provided courts flexibility with respect to prior art in KSR International
Co. v. Teleflex Inc.173 Under KSR, a patent may be held obvious with a specific
“teaching, suggestion, or motivation” identified in the prior art. In addition, such factors
as market conditions, technology trends, and the knowledge of someone skilled in the art
may support a determination that an innovation was not sufficiently inventive to be
patentable. KSR has given courts and the patent office more scope to address the prior art
problem with respect to software patents and business methods.174 One examiner rejected
a business method claim by relying, in part, on a description of business methods
described in the Bible as practiced by the Pharaoh.175 The machine-or-transformation test
could provide a similar tool, directed not at the prior art problem, but at the problem of
abstractness, which applies especially to software and business method patents.
¶54
The machine-or-transformation test will bar patent protection only for claims in
the most abstract terms. But the underlying policy behind the machine-or-transformation
test – preventing preemption of fundamental principles – can also be implemented in
other areas of patent law. The next sections attempt to show that Bilski’s most lasting
effect may be to solidify an increasing trend in patent law, and help craft patent law
doctrine that more specifically guards against preemption of fundamental principles.
¶55

171
Even the patent office has enlisted volunteers to identify prior art relevant to software patent
applications. See Beth Simone Noveck, “Peer to Patent”: Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and
Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 151-52 (2006).
172
See Jason Schultz, Staff Attorney, Electronic Frontier Foundation, The Patent Busting Project,
http://w2.eff.org/patent/EFF_Patent_Busting_Project.pdf (last visited Aug 5, 2009) (“Every year numerous
illegitimate patent applications make their way through the United States patent examination process
without adequate review. The problem is particularly acute in the software and Internet fields where the
history of prior inventions (often called ‘prior art’) is widely distributed and poorly documented.” The
patents include One-click online shopping (U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411); Online shopping carts (U.S. Patent
No. 5,715,314); The hyperlink (U.S. Patent No. 4,873,662); Video streaming (U.S. Patent No. 5,132,992);
Internationalizing domain names (U.S. Patent No. 6,182,148); Pop-up windows (U.S. Patent No.
6,389,458); Targeted banner ads (U.S. Patent No. 6,026,368); Paying with a credit card online (U.S. Patent
No. 6,289,319); Framed browsing; (U.S. Patent Nos. 5,933,841 & 6,442,574); and Affiliate linking (U.S.
Patent No. 6,029,141)).
173
550 U.S. 398 (2007).
174
See Friskit, Inc. v. RealNetworks, Inc., 306 F. App’x 610, 618 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (inventor merely
predicted a profitable business trend and did not contribute any technical innovation); MuniAuction, Inc. v.
Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (method of conducting municipal bond auctions
simply added use of internet browsers to existing methods of using software to conduct such auctions);
Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Emtrak, Inc., 544 F.3d 1310, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (simply substituting computer
communications in existing method is obvious under KSR); see also Commonwealth Scientific & Indus.
Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. (USA), Inc., 542 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding claimed
invention, a local wireless area network, was obvious under KSR). But see Eisai Co. Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy’s
Labs., Ltd., 533 F3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (active ingredient in ulcer drug Aciphex was not obvious,
where known structurally similar compound was not shown to lead to invention).
175
See Dennis Crouch, GO GO GO JOSEPH, Reject That Business Method, PATENTLY-O, Nov. 6,
2006, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/11/go_go_go_joseph.html.
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B. Enablement
¶56

Past Federal Circuit decisions have been criticized as essentially excusing
software inventors from the enablement requirement, the requirement that the patent
application provide sufficient disclosure for others to make and use the invention.176 In
particular, several decisions upheld broad software claims, even though the application
provided only rather general information about how to implement the claim.177 Rather,
the courts stated that putting the general invention into specific software was a task that
could simply be undertaken by a competent software developer:
The computer language is not a conjuration of some black art, it is simply a
highly structured language. . . . the conversion of a complete thought (as
expressed in English and mathematics, i.e., the known input, the desired output,
the mathematical expressions needed and the methods of using those expressions
into the language a machine understands is necessarily a mere clerical function
to a skilled programmer.178

¶57

Even where the application did not provide flow charts or block diagrams or other
information to suggest even in outline form how to implement the invention, the court
stated that general disclosure was sufficient, where a skilled programmer could figure out
how to write code that put the invention to work.179 Similarly, general descriptions of
structural elements were held sufficient. A claim that included a “timing means” was
upheld, even where the inventor did not disclose the firmware that he used as a timing
means.180
¶58
More recent decisions, however, reflect an underlying concern with abstract
patent claims and have applied the enablement requirement more stringently.181 The

176
35 U.S.C. §112 (2006). One key role of the patent system is to obtain disclosure of technology. Cf.
Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1009 (2008).
177
See N. Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d
809 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
178
Sherwood, 613 F.2d at 817 n.6 (emphasis added).
179
Northern Telecom, 908 F.2d at 941.
180
In re Hayes Microcomputer Prods., Inc. Patent Litig., 982 F.2d 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also Fonar
Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Thus, flow charts or source code listings
are not a requirement for adequately disclosing the functions of software. Here, substantial evidence
supports a finding that the software functions were disclosed sufficiently to satisfy the best mode
requirement.”); Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng’g, Inc., 112 F.3d 1163, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (When
“disclosure of software is required, it is generally sufficient if the functions of the software are disclosed, it
usually being the case that creation of the specific source code is within the skill of the art.”); In re Dossel,
115 F.3d 942, 946 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (disclosure sufficient where it was implicit that computer would be
means used).
181
See Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech. Inc., 498 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (invalidating patent claim
covering “automatic computer determination of the finish positions of teeth” where inventor did not
disclose specific method and had not succeeded in routinely practicing such a method), cert. denied, 128
S.Ct 2430 (U.S. May 12, 2008) (No. 07-1070); In re Reiffin, 199 F. App’x 965, 967 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(“[B]ecause Reiffin’s application is without any description as to how to implement his lexical analyzer,
the above claims necessarily require ‘undue experimentation’ in order for one of ordinary skill in the art to
make or use them.”); Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 236 F.3d 684, 691 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(“[T]he patent does not explain that stretching and squeezing of the borehole log, as well as significant trial
and error, are necessary to correlate (i.e., ‘compare’ and ‘rescale’) the logs. Nor does the patent describe
how to select sections of the borehole log to stretch or squeeze, or how to select points to correlate.”).
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Federal Circuit has emphasized that “the full scope of the claimed invention must be
enabled.”182 Most recently, the Federal Circuit held that broad claims that open new
fields require correspondingly broad disclosure.183 The inventors claimed a method of
reducing the activity of NF-țB, a transcription factor, which acts as an “all-purpose
cellular paramedic.”184 When cells suffer injury, NF-țB triggers the expression of genes
that produce molecules such as cytokines. Those molecules can repair injury, but also
injure the cell if produced in excess. The inventors had discovered all this, and claimed
the method of reducing NF-țB activity, which would have the therapeutic effect of
reducing unnecessary cell damage.185 Although the inventors had discovered a valuable
potential treatment method, their patent application did not disclose specifically how to
implement that method.186 They also claimed the invention in broader terms, rather than
limiting their claim to the methods of reduction that they had achieved. By claiming
more than their disclosure enabled, the patent was held invalid. As the court put it, “The
motto, ‘beware of what one asks for,’ might be applicable here.”187
¶59
Similar reasoning could be applied to abstract patents such as software and
business methods.188 A claim to a method that has broad application would not be
enabled if the written description did not provide sufficient disclosure to practice the
invention as broadly as the claims required.189 This would prevent an inventor from
preempting all application of an idea, as opposed to the applications that fell within the
scope of what her disclosure actually enabled.190 The inventor would also be limited to
the reasonable scope of her invention.191 This limit on the scope of abstract patents is
especially apt for software, where patent claims often use vague terms with meanings that
change over time and in different applications.192
182

Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Pharm. Res., Inc. v. Roxane Labs.,
Inc., 253 F. App’x 26, 30 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“surfactant” not enabled with just 3 working examples, where
the claims are broad in scope and the nature of the invention unpredictable); Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v.
BMW of N. Am., 501 F.3d 1274, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2007). See also Sean B. Seymore, The Enablement
Pendulum Swings Back, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 278 (2008).
183
Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The ’516 patent
discloses no working or even prophetic examples of methods that reduce NF-țB activity, and no completed
syntheses of any of the molecules prophesized to be capable of reducing NF-țB activity. The state of the
art at the time of filing was primitive and uncertain, leaving Ariad with an insufficient supply of prior art
knowledge with which to fill the gaping holes in its disclosure.”).
184
Id. at 1369.
185
Id. at 1370-71.
186
Id. at 1371-72.
187
Id at 1377. See also Lizardtech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (disclosure did not support broad reading of claim).
188
See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 239 (calling for stricter enforcement of the enablement
requirement for software patents).
189
Cf. Robert M. Hunt, Economics and the Design of Patent Systems, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 457 (2007) (suggesting that empirical analysis of software and business method patents supports
revisions to patent process that limit firm to rights to what it has in fact invented).
190
See Martin Campbell-Kelly & Patrick Valduriez, A Technical Critique of Fifty Software Patents, 9
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 249 (2005) (arguing that the fifty most cited software patents generally
represented genuine innovations and were not too broadly drafted, but that the level of disclosure was
deficient).
191
The claim scope could still cover after-developed technologies, although some have questioned
whether that is appropriate in some areas of technology. See Robin Feldman, Rethinking Rights in
Biospace, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2005) (proposing such a rule for biotechnology patents).
192
Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle Innings, 85 TEX. L. REV.
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Closely related to the enablement requirement is the requirement of
definiteness.193 Recent decisions have stringently applied the requirement that the
applicant “distinctly” claim the invention. Several decisions have invalidated claims for
indefiniteness, where under past case law the claims would likely have survived. One
example found a claim fatally invalid where it did not define the structure to implement a
“game control means.”194 The specification section of the patent application did state that
the function could be performed by a gaming machine using a programmed
microprocessor.195 However, the specification did not describe the algorithm or software
necessary to control the microprocessor.

¶61
C. Claim Interpretation
¶62

Patent law is quite different from copyright and trademark in one key respect.
The inventor defines the scope of her intellectual property protection. If an author writes
a book, she has a copyright in the book. Her copyright does not protect many elements in
the book (ideas, functional elements, unoriginal elements), but she is not required to
define which elements of her work are not protected by copyright. Rather, those
questions would be addressed later by a court in an infringement action.
¶63
In patent law, however, an inventor must submit an application distinctly pointing
out and claiming her invention. She may (and usually does) amend the claims during the
prosecution process. When the patent issues, the patent claims—not her actual
invention—determine the scope of her patent protection, and in deciding whether the
patent is valid, the court looks to the claims, not the actual invention. Abstract patent
claims create two problems.196 First, overly broad readings “reward patentees for
inventions they do not invent.”197 Second, “software patents may be particularly prone to
strategic use of vague language by applicants to gain underserved scope.”198 By using
vague language such as “point of sale location” (which could mean retail outlets, or could
include the home where a consumer places an order online), a patent applicant can seek
to make her claim read on technology far beyond her actual invention.199 Claim
interpretation can provides an important safeguard against overly broad patents.200

1627, 1627 (2007) (“[T]he legal system is integrating software into the fabric of patent law, and software
firms are integrating patents into the competitive fabric of the industry. Proper application of enablement
principles will help insure reasonable scope for software patents and thus assist this process of
normalization.”). See also Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2009) (arguing for
improvements on disclosure in patents).
193
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
194
See Aristocrat Techs. Australia Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Gaming Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 754 (U.S. Dec. 8, 2008) (No. 08-446). But see MIT v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that claim term “aesthetic correction circuitry” denoted sufficient structure
that it did not require further definition in the written specification).
195
Aristocrat Techs., 521 F.3d at 1333.
196
See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 199-200.
197
Id. at 199.
198
Id. at 200.
199
Id.
200
Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1 (2000) (differentiating
between “hypertextualism” and “pragmatic textualism”).
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¶64

Bilski’s emphasis on the policy of avoiding preemption of fundamental principles
is quite consistent with recent cases that have interpreted software claims narrowly, in a
way that avoids granting broad coverage. A claim covering a general purpose computer
would not be infringed by one using the method on an RISC processor.201 A process
including a step of “providing a communications link through equipment of the third
party” required that the infringer be an internet service provider.202 A claim on a method
of routing telephone calls, using a database of assigned locations, was not interpreted to
cover a later-developed method that could assign location in real-time as the call was
made.203
¶65
The machine-or-transformation test will bar some software and business method
inventions from patent protection, but will leave the majority within patentable subject
matter. Such patents may still suffer the greatest hazard of abstract patents. Because
language is so flexible, patent claims may be broadly interpreted to apply to afterdeveloped technologies that were independently created. Claim interpretation can
provide a powerful tool to implement patent policy. As some commentators have noted,
claim interpretation has often been used to limit the scope of software patents, but on a
rather ad hoc basis.204 That approach does not provide predictability, and so hurts both
patent holders and others who wish to use the technology. In short, “[i]f you can’t tell the
boundaries, then it ain’t property.”205 By identifying preemption as a central policy issue,
Bilski may play an important role in providing some regularity to the claim interpretation
process.
¶66
Sometimes a patent can be limited simply by enforcing its literal terms, and not
interpreting them with leeway toward likely applications. A patented method of
arbitration, for example, required the steps of “receiving a plurality of demands [and]
a plurality of settlement offers.”206 A practical reading would apply this to use where
only one demand or settlement offer was involved, as long as the method was capable of
dealing with multiple demands and offers.207 By limiting the scope of the patent to its
literal claims, the court effectively prevented early patents from being extended to other
practices. Likewise, where a bingo game patent claimed a “progressive predetermined
winning combination,” it was not infringed by a bingo game where the winner was
determined when balls were drawn—even if the two games were substantially similar.208

201

Hutchins v. Zoll Med. Corp., 492 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
See Netcraft Corp. v. eBay, Inc., 549 F.3d 1394, 1397 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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See 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Sec. Ltd., 539 F.3d 1354, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (patent claim on
method of routing telephone calls interpreted not to cover assignments made during the call, as opposed to
assignments made before the call by constructing data base), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1373 (U.S. Feb. 23,
2009) (No. 08-859). See also Mangosoft, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., 525 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding
that “local” means directly attached to computer, not just on the same network).
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See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, ch. 9, available at
http://www.researchoninnovation.org/dopatentswork/dopat9.pdf (“Even though judges may often (but not
always!) take a pragmatic approach and interpret such claims narrowly—as they seem to do often with
software patents—the uncertainty about boundaries makes clearance difficult and subjects inventors to risk
of inadvertent infringement.”).
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BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 46.
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Cybersettle, Inc. v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, Inc., 243 F. App’x 603, 605 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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See id.
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Planet Bingo, LLC v. GameTech Int’l, Inc., 472 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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¶67

Claim interpretation can work hand in hand with the disclosure requirements. In
determining how broadly a claim should be read, a court can refer to the patentee’s
description of the invention and how much enabling disclosure she has provided. Here,
courts must be careful not to run afoul of other patent law policies. In particular, claim
interpretation should favor disclosure. Some past decisions risk penalizing patentees for
disclosure. If claims were interpreted mechanically to apply only to the embodiments of
the invention disclosed by the inventor, then the inventor would lose her legitimate right
to enforce the claims against improvements or alternative embodiments of her actual
invention, where those fall within the reasonable scope of the claims. Patent applicants
will react to such “gotcha” interpretation by providing vague and general disclosure.209
Claim interpretation should reward, not punish disclosure.
¶68
Courts can also use more specific rules to limit patent scope appropriately. A
potential tool would be interpretation of transition phrases. A patent claim can use an
open transition phrase, such as “comprising.” This means the claim covers a device or
process with additional elements not listed in the claim.210 So, a claim on a process
“comprising steps A, B, and C” would cover a process with steps A, B, C and D. By
contrast, a closed transition phrase, such as “consisting of,” means that the claim covers
only the elements claimed, and not a device or process with additional elements. A claim
on a process “consisting of steps A, B, and C” would not cover a process with steps A,
B, C and D, only a process limited to steps A, B, and C. Closed transition phrases are
most often used in areas involving physical elements. An inventor may develop a new
molecule that contains a structure that already appears in larger molecules. In order to
claim something new, the inventor limits her claim to the new molecule, and excludes
larger molecules that contain that structure but also other elements.
¶69
But, transition phrases could also be used to limit software or business method
inventions to the reasonable scope of the invention. If a software process were claimed
with an open transition phrase, and so read on software inventions that went well beyond
the scope of the original invention, then it could be held to be overly broad. By the same
token, a claim that was limited by a closed transition phrase would be valid—but would
not be infringed by technology with additional elements.211
¶70
The reverse doctrine of equivalents is another specific doctrine that courts have
not used much, and could also be used to police claim scope (and so reduce the risk of
preemption). Under the reverse doctrine of equivalents, a patent claim may be
interpreted to read less narrowly than its literal language, where appropriate to avoid the
claim reaching beyond the equitable scope of the invention.212 Although the doctrine has
209
See Stephen McJohn, Patents: Hiding from History, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
961, 963 (2008).
210
MCJOHN, supra note 169. See, e.g., AFG Indus., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., Inc., 239 F.3d 1239 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
211
Cf. Duncan Greenhalgh, Patentability of Expressed Sequence Tags: A Tempest in a Teacup? 34 (Apr.
16, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (suggesting that controversy over patenting gene
fragments could be resolved by limiting such patent claims to closed transition phrases, which would limit
patent protection to the fragment alone, rather than the sequences containing the fragment).
212
Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[W]here a device is so
far changed in principle from a patented article that it performs the same or similar function in a
substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the claim, the reverse doctrine
of equivalents may be used to restrict the claim and defeat the patentee’s action for infringement.” (quoting
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-609 (1950)).
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played a small role in patent law,213 it could be a useful tool when appropriate to limit the
scope of software or business methods patents. Because such patents sometimes use
vague and abstract language that can take the claims far beyond the scope of the original
invention, the reverse doctrine of equivalents may sometimes be appropriate to prevent
the abstract language from reading on technology that is actually quite different in
principle from the underlying invention (as opposed to the claim language in the patent).
IV. CONCLUSION
¶71

Bilski transforms one of the hazards of patent law into a jurisprudential benefit.
Patent law must always struggle with the difficulty of capturing technology within the
words of patent claims. The machine-or-transformation test announced by Bilski cannot
escape that difficulty, but uses the flexibility of language advantageously. “Machine”
and “transform” are vague words, but the test provides a tool for courts to implement a
key patent law policy, according an inventor patent rights measured to her invention,
without preempting fundamental principles.

213

Roche, 531 F.3d at 1378 (“The reverse doctrine of equivalents is rarely applied, and this court has
never affirmed a finding of non-infringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents.”).
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